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Introduction
In the early phase of the year 2020, a novel virus outbreak 
led to a worldwide pandemic with millions of confirmed 
cases (1) that caused large proportions of the world 
population to be in temporary lockdown. With non-essential 
travel discouraged and everyone but key workers staying 
at home the world economy came to a sudden pause (2). 
The containment of the virus, a novel coronavirus named 
COVID-19, required quick resource re-allocation on a 
large scale and was prioritised on every level of healthcare 
delivery, first identified in East Asia. As the outbreak 
continued the epicentre shifted to Europe and the Middle 
East, and eventually affected the Americas (3). It led to 
restrictions on public life previously unimaginable during 
times of peace (4). Schools were closed, work from home 
was strongly encouraged, and non-essential travel was 
forbidden; some regions, and even countries, were entirely 
locked down for weeks or months (5).
Restrictions to public life were necessary to avoid 
many people being infected at the same time which would 
have led to a collapse of the healthcare system. With no 
immunity to this new virus in the general population and 
many people being infected and potentially requiring 
critical care treatment at the same time, it was essential to 
reduce the rate of new infections (6).
In this document, we discuss factors that must be 
considered during pandemic outbreaks, and introduce the 
load-to-capacity model for healthcare delivery, to explain 
how saturation of the system can be averted (7), and 
explore what the implications are for long-term investment 
decisions in healthcare.
Load-to-capacity model 
The structure and function of national healthcare systems 
are important for effective healthcare delivery when facing a 
sudden and substantial surge in demand. The model (Figure 1) 
shows the resources that need to be considered when 
addressing the demand in a pandemic.
Capacity
In non-pandemic times, capacity in most countries is 
largely, but not exclusively, limited by the investment into 
healthcare as provided by a national or insurance-based 
system. In times of a pandemic, governments and healthcare 
policymakers are likely to adjust healthcare-related budgets 
to try and address the acute demand. 
Staff 
Medical staff with appropriate expertise and skillsets in 
sufficient numbers beyond the regular hospital and critical 
care capacity, is essential to cope with pandemic demand. 
Critical care skilled staff, often redeployed from other 
services, needs to be available if the most severe cases of 
infection are to be treated according to best standards. The 
workforce varies in developed countries by a factor of two 
for doctors, between 2.1–4.3 per 1,000 population, and 
by about the same factor for nurses, between 8.2–17.4 per 
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Figure 1 Load-to-Capacity model of healthcare systems. The system remains in a compensated or balanced state as long as the capacity can 
meet the load, but if the load increases sufficiently a tipping point is reached and healthcare delivery fails.
1,000 population (8). 
In non-pandemic times, intensive care units are guided 
by established care pathways, specialist nurse and medical 
cover, close relationships with other operational delivery 
networks, interdependency and close proximity to co-
located services (9). In a pandemic, most essential services, 
particularly critical care units, will be overstretched and 
expand to additional wards and clinical areas (e.g., in 
operation theatres) that will need to be served for by 
redeployed staff. 
In such situations, the “level of care”, defined by the ratio 
of critical care nurses per patient, typically defined as 1:1 
for level III beds, 1:2 for level II beds and 1:3 for level I 
beds (10) will quickly be diluted. In the NHS Nightingale 
hospital in London, UK, a new hospital that was set up to 
cope with the COVID-19 crisis, the ratio of critical care 
nurse per patient was initially planned to be 1:6 in the worst 
case scenario (11). 
The general public has an important part to play in 
supporting the capacity of the healthcare system, both 
by influencing resource allocation decisions and by 
volunteering (12), as well as by following government 
guidance. During exceptional circumstances, the military 
may also be engaged for logistical and operational support 
to strengthen capacity.
Hospital and critical care bed capacity
There are finite hospital beds in non-pandemic times. 
However, in pandemic times inflated bed capacity 
means that lives can be saved. Total bed capacity varies 
approximately by a factor 10 between all countries, from 
1.4 to 13.1 per 1,000 people. There are sparse published 
data on critical care bed capacity, but wherever data are 
available the rate differs between 3.6 to 47.1 beds per 
100,000 citizen, with the majority of countries ranging 
between 5 and 15 beds per 100,000 (13). 
Bed capacity is key factor that determines whether 
patients can be looked after in hospitals during a pandemic. 
In case of clinical deterioration, it is particularly the critical 
care bed capacity that is essential to keep patients alive 
whilst their immune system clears the virus and vital organs, 
particularly the lungs, recover. However, hospital occupancy 
rates are to be about 85% in non-pandemic times (14). In 
order to provide best possible care for infected patients, it 
is therefore essential to inflate the critical care bed capacity 
quickly during a pandemic. 
A limiting factor for critical care bed availability is the 
turnover time of affected cases. In patients with COVID-19 
this is, in most cases, between 7–14 days. When critical 
care bed capacity is saturated the ceiling of care needs to be 
considered for any subsequent admissions, which requires 
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triage and, unfortunately, impacts significantly on overall 
mortality. In the UK, the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence, NICE, published guidance that patients 
with a Clinical Frailty Score (CFS) of less than five points, 
which indicates that patients are not dependent, should 
be considered for critical care support, as it was likely to 
be beneficial. However, NICE also recommended that for 
patients with a score of five or more points on the CFS, 
which indicates mild frailty, “there is uncertainty regarding 
the likely benefit of critical care organ support” (15).
Population
The demographics of a specific population matter in the 
current pandemic. Age, gender, ethnicity, comorbidities, 
density and exposure to urban areas, physical and mental 
health as well as compliance with public health guidance 
define potentially vulnerable or at risk cohorts, but 
these factors may also indicate solutions for successful 
risk stratification and non-vaccination measures. It is 
important to prepare the population to avoid anxiety 
and unnecessary actions. This is best achieved by regular 
open communication to explain decisions taken, current 
developments in the dynamics of the pandemic, and 
guidance on strengthening mental and physical health 
during lockdowns, to keep people motivated, involved and 
active (16). It has to be considered that overall wellbeing 
includes financial and social aspects that are of great 
importance and will contribute to people’s compliance with 
long-term restrictions to their lives. The full extent the 
impact of a pandemic lockdown, either individually due to 
loss of income and employment, or for the economy due 
to reduced trade and business activity, may only become 
apparent once the disease is controlled, but can have a 
hugely detrimental effect on non-infected parts of the 
population.
Equipment and consumables 
Logistical requests of large scale orders during pandemic 
times can cause problems in affected countries and this 
affected particularly Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
and ventilators (17): 
	 In the most severe cases of COVID-19, intensive 
care ventilators are licensed to invasively ventilate 
intubated patients. Although there are other kinds 
of ventilators, such as non-invasive ventilators, 
continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) 
machines and home mechanical ventilators, it is the 
ventilators that are licensed for critical care that are 
essential to keep very sick patients alive. 
	 In the initial stages of the pandemic there was not 
enough PPE available to protect frontline staff and 
key workers. Even at the peak the Royal College of 
Physicians in London, having surveyed NHS staff, 
found that only 78% had access to adequate PPE (18). 
Sensible professional guidance on appropriate PPE 
should not be influenced by policymakers who are 
facing limited supplies; this can cause confusion 
about what PPE pieces are required. A lack of PPE 
or inappropriate guidance on PPE exposes frontline 
staff to avoidable infections, and sometimes death, 
with many healthcare workers off sick or self-
isolating. During the early phase of the pandemic, 
about 18–21% of NHS staff had to take time off 
work due to infection or self-isolation (18). 
At the peak of the pandemic oxygen availability also 
required serious consideration, as maximal flow rates were 
reached in some hospitals. High-flow nasal oxygen, CPAP 
and non-invasive ventilation machines were similarly in 
high demand, but due to the aerosol generating nature of 
these therapies some hospitals had to put restrictions on 
where and how these devices could be used.
Testing and contact tracing
Testing for COVID-19 is essential to understand the 
prevalence of the disease, the affected areas and the 
hospitalization rates, and it is also required to accurately 
assess mortality. Some countries did not test many patients, 
particularly in the beginning of the pandemic. However, 
other countries recognized early that by testing and 
identifying cases, isolation measures were more efficient and 
case identification and tracing contacts could help to avoid 
the spread of the disease, slow and limit the outbreak. 
Tests performed per 1,000 of the population differed 
significantly between countries; some countries performed 
3–8 tests per 1,000 citizens during the initial period of 
the pandemic while other countries achieved between 
13–18 tests per 1,000 citizens relatively early (19). Once 
affected countries agreed that testing was helpful and 
available daily test capacity then became the next issue. 
Existing facilities needed to adjust their laboratories to 
accommodate large scale requests. Despite limited accuracy 
testing can provide relative certainty with the diagnosis. 
It is another tool to try and contain the disease, allocate 
resources and effort, and it allows self-isolating healthcare 
staff to return safely to the frontline once cleared. Amongst 
respondents to a survey in the UK National Health Service, 
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about 31% of the workforce had access to testing at the 
height of the pandemic (17). The ratio of positive tests 
compared to all tests taken is a good indication of whether 
sufficient case numbers are tested; a high rate of positive 
results would indicate that it is likely there are many more 
cases that go unnoticed and untested. It remains uncertain 
to what extent modern technology, e.g., smartphone 
applications, will be helpful in tracing contacts during a 
pandemic in the future, as civil rights and liberties need to 
be carefully balanced with the greater good of public health.
Investment
Strategic planning and investment in a modern healthcare 
system facilitates the retention of skilled medical and 
technical staff, allows the use of the latest equipment, the 
latest evidence-based tests and treatments prepare the 
system for a sudden surge of patients during a pandemic. 
Pre-existing infrastructure can be scaled quickly. However, 
annual investment into healthcare in western systems differs 
remarkably between countries, US$3,377–US$9,403 per 
capita (mean US$5,419) (8).
New drugs become available faster if investment into 
research and development has successfully established 
an infrastructure that can respond to a sudden change in 
demand. Governance structures, ethical review boards and 
procedures to record side effects and respond to adverse 
events need to be already in place prior to a pandemic. 
Once the acute phase of  the infect ion is  over, 
rehabilitation and weaning programmes for survivors of 
critical care, with focus on physical and mental health, 
are essential to restore quality of life (20). Post critical 
care rehabilitation requires time, space, physiotherapists, 
multidisciplinary guidance, as well as psychological 
counselling. Weaning units that specialize in ventilation and 
rehabilitation facilitate complex discharges and act as an 
appropriate interface between acute and community care. 
Lastly, the placement of patients who require ongoing 
care or ventilation following discharge from hospital requires 
appropriate investment. In parallel to those affected directly 
by the pandemic infection, there is an additional need to 
support the general public, who have not had the infection, 
by putting in place furlough schemes, unemployment support 
and engaging banks to supply the public and businesses with 
uncomplicated credits to aid employment for those adversely 
affected by the impact of the public lockdown. 
The capacity assessment of a healthcare system is critically 
important if it is to be prepared for a pandemic. Such 
assessments are important and necessary during non-pandemic 
times, as prevention is massively cost-effective compared with 
the impact of an unprepared system for a pandemic.
Load
The demand on any healthcare system varies with time, 
affected by the seasons (influenza) and disease states and 
by the demographics of the population. Treatment and 
care need to be cost-effective to sustain an equitable 
healthcare system. Cost-effectiveness can be assessed 
and calculated. In evidence-based medicine, healthcare 
structure and function is continuously assessed to ensure 
that healthcare provision remains affordable for the entire 
population. This is achieved by examining whether specific 
diagnostics/therapeutics can be rolled out across a nation. 
Individual countries typically set specific threshold levels 
for cost-effectiveness depending on their budgets, however, 
quality adjusted life years (QALYs) are an internationally 
accepted measure used to compare interventions and to 
judge whether treatments are affordable (21). During the 
COVID-19 pandemic, with sudden and unpredictable 
changes in the load on the healthcare system, new evidence 
needs to be considered on a daily base.
Cases
The case load on a healthcare system is the single most 
significant parameter. In a typical flu pandemic, the season 
is often stretched out over a period of several months (e.g., 
October to April) and infected patients do not present all at 
once. In the current pandemic with COVID-19, the entire 
population had no antibodies to the virus and the infection 
flared up in regions like a tsunami wave, affecting regions 
and then entire countries and their population within days 
and weeks. 
The basic reproduction number, R0, is important, as it is 
influenced by the exponential increase in infected patients 
during the outbreak, factors such as the latent infectious 
state and the infection period. In COVID-19, R0 was 
initially described to be between 1.4 and 3.8 in Wuhan/
China, but during the outbreak in New York/US it was 
estimated to be 5.7 (95% Confidence interval: 3.8–8.9) (22). 
R0 is also used to estimate the portion of the population 
that is required to have antibodies, either by prior infection 
or vaccination, to lead to disease extinction (1 − 1/R0); for 
R0 =5.7 this proportion is 82% (22). To control an outbreak 
over time, R0 needs to be consistently below 1.0. 
COVID-19 can resolve in many patients with minor 
symptoms, but in some cases it causes a sudden and severe 
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acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) like picture with 
organ failure that requires intubation and ventilation (23). In 
these cases, critical care bed and ventilator availability define 
the ceiling of care. In addition, renal replacement therapy and 
access to extra-corporal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) are 
of similar value for patients with multi-organ failure.
Morbidity
In an entirely novel disease, it is important to understand 
the impact on human physiology. In COVID-19, there 
seem to be different risks and outcomes depending on 
gender, with men being more affected than women, age, 
with elderly (>60 years) more at risk than younger patients 
and, possibly, pregnancy putting expecting women at risk. 
In addition, ethnicity can have an impact on outcomes, with 
black, Asian and other minorities being at higher risk in the 
UK and the US. However, factual assessments of risks and 
symptoms can only be based on evidence and, thus, testing 
of infected patients and the general public in pandemic 
times is important to identify accurate risk ratios and stratify 
cohorts into susceptible subjects based on confirmed cases 
in a new disease (24).
Mortality
Mortality is defined as the number of patients who die due to 
a condition divided by all people who are affected by the same 
disease. In the COVID-19 outbreak mortality differed widely 
across regions (3). This was likely due to many different factors: 
varying stages of preparedness for the pandemic, the regional 
capacity of hospital and critical beds, the speed of cross-
infections (R0), the different approaches that governments took 
towards testing, and, partially, due to logistical organizational 
decisions taken. However, it is only by the means of testing 
that mortality rates can be accurately reported: 
(I) Patients in the community may not be identified 
and a selected cohort of patients presenting 
to hospital will falsely imply a high mortality. 
Mortality will be overestimated in this scenario;
(II) On the other hand, deaths in the community may 
not be assigned to the pandemic if they are not 
tested. This could underestimate the true mortality 
rate;
(III) Both of the above scenarios may be possible at the 
same time, in which case an accurate mortality rate 
in the country/region is impossible to predict, unless 
the caseload is identified by widespread testing.
Without understanding these three scenarios it is difficult 
to judge whether a pandemic response has been successful 
in any given healthcare system.
Public health interventions 
Due to the novelty of the virus, there were no initial 
antiviral treatments in the COVID-19 pandemic, and 
vaccination was unavailable. The main focus in the period 
of exponential growth of cases across the world relied 
therefore on public health measures that were summarized 
as ‘non-vaccination’ measures in public health, including 
isolation, quarantine, case identification/contact tracing, 
restrictions to movements and travel, as well as lockdowns. 
Although these measures do not cure any infected subject, 
they provide essential time for the healthcare system to cope 
with the number of patients and spread out the caseload 
over a longer period. The risk is that without such actions 
an exponential increase in the number of patients quickly 
leads to a saturation of existing healthcare facilities, even 
in the best funded systems (3,6). Saturation of critical care 
beds would have a devastating effect on the mortality during 
a pandemic, and frontline staff would have the challenging 
task of triaging patients who arrive at the hospital when 
there is no capacity available.
The caseload is influenced by the regulations and public 
restrictions that are put in place by national governments (25), 
ideally in accord with international guidelines (26). A 
lockdown, however, has knock-on effects on physical 
and mental health and may be more acceptable to some 
populations, as previously experienced during influenza 
pandemics (27). Furthermore, there may be an indirect 
impact, a displacement effect, on patients that do not have 
COVID-19 infections, but who are unable to seek attention 
for their health concerns due to full hospitals, lack of 
ambulances and shut down services. Most healthcare 
systems have regularly updated statistics on morbidity 
and mortality across different regions and hospitals (28). 
Following normalization of any pandemic it is essential 
to compare routine morbidity and mortality numbers, as 
well as Accidents and Emergencies (A&E) numbers to the 
ones registered during the pandemic. This will elucidate 
any indirect impact of the pandemic on non-infected 
patients, and there were early reports in the UK that A&E 
attendance was down by 50% during the pandemic when 
compared to the previous year.
Lastly, it greatly matters whether, and to what extent, 
government and society supports people in lockdown, 
with social and monetary means (29), as well as promoting 
mental health and physical exercise, and providing advice 
and information programmes (15). 
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Hospital occupancy rate 
High value healthcare aims to reach the entire population 
with the resources available. In an ideal world, any 
treatment would be available to everyone. However, even 
in the most advanced healthcare systems this remains a 
long-term goal. It is therefore essential to find the right 
balance between healthcare demand and available resources, 
a process that involves different parties: (I) the people; (II) 
healthcare delivery services, that may also act as advocates 
on behalf of the patients; and (III) funding providers, who 
can be governments, insurers, or private providers. 
Pandemic resource allocation can lead to expansion of 
existing healthcare structures, but only by limited margins, e.g. 
being limited by the national GDP or possible debt. The 
rate at which expansion is possible and the extent to which 
this can happen define whether the sudden clinical case load 
imposed on the system can be compensated or not. The 
responsiveness to expand existing infrastructure by a defined 
margin is an important factor to cope with the peak during 
a pandemic. Well invested systems may have an advantage, 
as they require less expansion from a higher baseline; the 
difference between baseline and peak investment (delta) 
is also smaller than in under-invested structures and it is 
likely that adjustments can be made faster. Lastly, expansion 
impacts on non-healthcare related resources to a lesser 
degree if previous investment was higher (Figure 2).
It is important to consider the average turnover rate of 
cases in a pandemic. Hospital bed occupancy rate, typically 
recommended to be about 80–85% in non-pandemic times 
(9,10), needs to be re-adjusted and targets will be beyond 
the regular 100% bed capacity of non-pandemic times. The 
ability to recruit additional bed capacity, particularly critical 
care beds, in proportion to the turnover rate can be defined 
as the pandemic mobilisation index. A higher index indicates 
a more flexible healthcare system and makes it more likely 
that the system will cope with the demand (“compensated”); 
a low index indicates that it is more likely the system will 
not be sufficiently prepared and may be at risk of saturation 
(“decompensated”; Figure 1).
Typically, adjustments to healthcare infrastructure 
require a cost-benefit analysis, for example by calculating 
the cost-effectiveness (QALY), but this may not be 
possible during a sudden pandemic and raises questions 
as to whether decisions taken during the pandemic can be 
Figure 2 Schematic illustration of healthcare investment required for a pandemic response. Most healthcare systems invest a set percentage 
of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) into healthcare (average indicated by the black striped box, b, with a and c indicating higher or 
lower investments, respectively). Shortly after ‘1’, investment for a pandemic response is required as indicated by curves I–IV: (I) low levels 
of additional investment, largely covered by higher baseline investment, as defined by % of GDP, are possible for national budgets to sustain 
for longer. (II) Most countries will require a response similar to this model, significant investment above baseline for a relevant duration, 
impacting on other economic factors, as indicated by the yellow box. (III) Several countries will have assigned a sudden surge in investment, 
significantly impacting on most other resources during the pandemic. (IV) This is a ‘wartime-like’ scenario in assigning all available 
resources to the pandemic resolution; the entire economy is affected (red box). However, it is likely that this level of investment cannot 
endure prolonged periods, as the regular economy comes to a standstill. Time in arbitrary units, investment in estimated % of GDP. Early 
investment might allow for savings later on, as a full outbreak of a pandemic might be averted.
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scrutinized under general principles.
Healthcare structure
The structure of the healthcare system prior to any 
pandemic influences its flexibility to generate a response. 
Social and population-based systems covering the 
entire population will have certain advantages, and will 
have systems whereby workforces and resources can be 
exchanged quickly following the solidarity principle. Rivalry 
in fragmented healthcare systems may be disadvantageous 
for the provision of sufficient flexibility when there is a 
sudden demand. However, governments have emergency 
powers in a pandemic scenario and can use them, wisely 
and early, in an emerging pandemic scenario to create a 
concerted and optimal response (25).
Discussion
Understanding the direct and indirect effects of the 
COVID-19 pandemic is important when preparing for 
future pandemics. Decisions that lead to delays early on in 
a pandemic may prove very costly later on. A comparative 
analysis of different healthcare systems can identify the 
factors related to load and capacity of existing healthcare 
structures that need to be addressed in non-pandemic times. 
Currently, many aspects of the crisis management of the 
COVID-19 pandemic remain contentious across the world. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is arguably the most demanding 
non-wartime scenario in living memory that people across the 
globe have had to endure. This is, however, of little comfort 
to policymakers who face growing public unease during this 
unprecedented period. The expectation will be that in the 
future all countries are better prepared for pandemics.
Comparison to non-pandemic mortality
Whilst every death in the COVID-19 pandemic is a tragic 
story, it is important to compare this pandemic with non-
pandemic times. How does current mortality compare 
to non-pandemic times? In New York (NY) State, one of 
the most affected regions in the world (3), septicaemia 
ranked 9th–10th amongst leading causes of death in the years 
2014–2017, with 2,296–2,601 deaths per annum. Deaths in 
NY caused by non-communicable disease lead the tables 
in non-pandemic times; heart disease with 45,000 deaths 
per annum and cancer with 35,000. The ten most common 
conditions that led to death caused 113,651–117,466 annual 
deaths between 2014–2017 (NY), an average rate of almost 
10,000 deaths each month for NY only (30). The question 
will be in a year’s time to compare these data with the 
number of excess deaths in New York during the pandemic.
Lessons to learn
Investment
A well-invested healthcare system is likely to cope better and 
faster with a pandemic. This includes, but is by no means 
limited to, hospital beds, critical care capacity and sufficient 
PPE and ventilators. It also requires a long-term strategy 
beyond today, to invest in research and development, 
which play an important role to prepare for unforeseen 
scenarios, and can help to provide testing capacity and new 
drugs, or help with tracing and PPE. Currently, spending 
on healthcare differs remarkably, even between high-
income countries, and future policymakers should consider 
whether the healthcare budget is appropriate to allow for 
extraordinary circumstances. 
Laboratories that are well funded and undertaking clinical 
trials are more likely to respond quickly to requests for 
testing, development of new vaccinations, and provision of 
new drugs. Equipment, particularly critical care equipment, 
including ventilators, ECMO and renal replacement therapy, 
needs to be available in sufficient quantity when a pandemic 
strikes, as delays can mean that lives are lost.
Medical and nursing staff
The number of doctors and nurses per 1,000 population 
differs by about a factor of two in high-income countries (8). 
The training and development of medical frontline staff in 
times of a pandemic requires advanced planning. It may be 
appropriate to train large numbers of frontline healthcare 
staff, particularly nurses and doctors, in annual mandatory 
sessions, covering critical care beyond conventional basic/
advanced life support (e.g., equipment/ventilators/PPE). 
Integrated health and care services 
Intelligent and novel pathways and standard operating 
procedures (SOP) that have been developed during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, including surge work rotas, stepwise 
opening of new units and sharing of devices to serve more 
cases, need to be put in place to prepare for similar events 
in future. Planning for survivors and preparing for capacity 
during the stepdown procedures, including rehabilitation 
and weaning units with sufficient expertise, and therapist 
support, and long-term care arrangements out of hospital 
are helpful for patients as they try to achieve normality.
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There are many lessons to be learned from this pandemic, 
across each affected service, in healthcare, care homes, and in 
the general population as well as by policymakers and business. 
Every branch of society should review their preparations and 
standard operating procedure for similar events and create a 
hierarchy of priorities, set goals for achievements (short-, mid- 
and long-term). It is our duty to ask inconvenient questions 
and learn from what went well during the pandemic, as well as 
what did not go well, once the pandemic is under control.
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